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When working with micro data one sometimes encounters situations involving qualitative 
choices in addition to the continuous choices that are the traditional focus of empirical 
analysis. One such situation arises when we study the increase in multiple job-holdings 
among farm operators in western economies. In these analyses we are both interested in the 
qualitative choice of entering the off-farm labour market and the continuous choice of 
determining labour supply in all occupations. This paper presents a unified framework for 
formulating such a discrete/continuous choices that include randomness within the decision-
making process. We consider the joint labour decisions of operator and spouse through an 
agricultural household model that combines the agricultural production, consumption, and 
labour supply decisions in a single framework. We develop a probabilistic decision rule for 
participating in off-farm work and derive the demand functions in farm production and 
labour supply functions in off-farm sector.   2
Introduction 
Most articles concerning labour decisions of farm households are based on neoclassical 
theory. The central assumption of the theory is that of optimisation and the 
individuals/households are assumed to maximize their utility, which is a function of 
consumption goods and leisure time, subject to constraints on time, income and farm 
production. For an individual to be able to rank all his alternative allocations there are certain 
key assumptions that must be satisfied to give the desired properties to an individual’s 
preference ordering. First of all, we must assume that the individual has unlimited information 
of all possible alternative allocations. Secondly, we must assume that he is able to rank all 
alternatives in a consistent and well-defined order, however alike or unlike they may be. This 
includes the assumption of transitivity which states that if a is preferred to b and b is preferred 
to c, then a must be preferred to c, and the assumption of reflexivity which states that all 
alternatives are preferred or indifferent to itself. These assumptions allow us to partition any 
given allocation into non-intersecting indifference curves that can be illustrated in a two-
dimensional diagram where consumption of consumer goods is represented along the x-axis 
and consumption of leisure along the y-axis
1. To give these indifference curves a particular 
structure we usually add assumptions of non-satiation (alternative a is preferred to alternative 
b if a contains more of at least one good and no less of any other), continuity of the 
indifference curves (changes in consumption of purchased goods can be fully compensated by 
changes in consumption of leisure), and strict convexity (the set of alternatives that are 
preferred to alternative a is strictly convex). 
 
The neoclassical approach can be criticized for not giving a very adequate description of 
human behaviour. People don’t usually have perfect information of the alternatives they can 
choose among and the choices they make are not necessarily consistent with their previous 
behaviour. It is not difficult to picture a situation where we get problems with ranking the 
alternatives we face. Even the simplest comparisons may cause uncertainties; given that I am 
feeling a bit peckish, do I prefer a sandwich or would I be better off by spending my last 
money on a pint of lager? Often we find that the choice alternatives are much more complex 
than this example. It is also highly probable that our preferences change over time. They may 
                                                 
1 We treat the vector of all purchased consumption goods as one argument of the utility function and the 
household’s leisure as a second argument. The household’s preferences can then be presented as indifference 
curves in a two-dimensional diagram. 
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even change within a few minutes depending on what new information or shock that occurs. I 
may go from peckish to hungry within a short while and actually go for the sandwich! A 
household’s preferences for leisure may be dependent on household characteristics like 
number and age of children, with personal characteristics like age and education, and with 
local labour market characteristics. In this case there exists exogenous variables that affect the 
choices the household makes.  
 
Some argue that choice behaviour should be modelled as a probabilistic process to account 
for the individuals’ uncertainty and for the observed inconsistency (Tversky 1972). This 
approach implies that we associate probabilities with either of the alternatives. If we are going 
to introduce probabilistic processes in our model, we need to consider what factors determine 
the probabilities. Shall we focus on the inconsistencies in the individuals’ behaviour or are the 
measurement problems and inappropriate model specifications of greater concern? We must 
also distinguish between models with stochastic decision rules (and deterministic utility) and 
models with stochastic utility (and deterministic decision rule), respectively. In the first case 
we have a situation where an individual don’t necessarily choose the alternative that brings 
him the higher utility, while in the second case the individual will choose the alternative that 
he expects will bring him the higher utility The second alternative is thus closer to the 
neoclassical models. 
 
We can think of several reasons why we may not be able to model the labour decisions of the 
multiple-job holding households correctly. A common, and more or less unavoidable, 
problem is that we can’t fully observe all the factors that enter into the individuals’ utility 
functions. We may i.e. have insufficient knowledge of preferences for farming and attachment 
to the farm property (maintenance of family traditions ect). This kind of heterogeneity in 
preferences will lead to greater variance in our estimates. Another source of uncertainty may 
stem from insufficient recordings of observable variables like farm characteristics, 
household/individual characteristics, and regional characteristics. A seemingly important 
explanatory variable when estimating off-farm labour supply that more often than not seems 
to be absent from the reaserchers’ data sets, is the individuals level of education. The lack of 
such variables contributes to increase the unexplained part of the model. According to Manski 
(1977) the different sources of uncertainty can be listed in four groups: Non-observable 
characteristics (when the vector of characteristics affecting the choice of the individual is 
only partially known by the modeler), non-observable variations in individual utilities (when   4
the variance in preferences increase with increasing preference heterogeneity), measurement 
errors (when the amount of the observable characteristics is not perfectly known) and 
functional misspecifications (when the functional form of utility is not known with certainty).  
 
Theoretical Model 
We view the decision to participate in off-farm wage work by farm operators (O) and their 
spouses (S) through an agricultural household model that combines agricultural production, 
consumption and labour supply decisions into a single framework. The model bear 
resemblance to models used by Huffman and Lange (1989), Gould and Saupe (1989), Lass 
and Gempesaw (1992), and Weersink, Nicholson and Weerhewa (1997).  
 
The population of farm household face the same choice set of alternative occupations. We 
assume that they are statistically identical and independently distributed. This assumption 
implies that their choices are governed by the same mulitnominal distribution and that the 
choices made by one household are independent of the choices made by others. The actual 
time allocations are allowed to vary between households. 
 
I was planning to choose a random utility approach to model the off-farm labour decisions 
based on McFadden’s conditional logit model. My aim was to let the households maximize 
utility by choosing among four alternative allocations: 
D1  both operator and spouse participate in wage work:   M M
O S > > 0 0 ,    
D2  only operator participates in wage work:      M M
O S > = 0 0 ,    
D3  only spouse participates in wage work:      M M
O S = > 0 0 ,    
D4  neither of them participates in wage work:      M M
O S = = 0 0 ,    
 
where  M i O S
i ,  = ,  represents hours in off-farm wage work for operator and spouse. The 
optimization problem includes a discrete choice (whether to participate in off-farm work or 
not) and a continuous choice of finding the optimal allocation of time between the available 
options; farm work, off-farm work and leisure. 
 
My intention was to find a way of expressing the indirect utility (U n n
* , , ,   ,  =12 34) of each 
alternative as a function of the attributes of the nth alternative, V X n n ( ), and a random term,   5
en, which should capture the unobserved variations in tastes and characteristics of the 
households and unobserved attributes of the alternative 
 
  U V X n n n n
* ( ) = +e  
 
while the discrete choice could be expressed as 
 
D
U U U U U n
n
n =
= = R S T
1 12 34
0
1 2 3 4    if    Max    
   otherwise
* * * * * ( , , , ) , , ,
. 
 
This caused me some trouble as I also wanted the decision rule to be stochastic. I have 
struggled with different kinds of specifications and have eventually ended up with what 
follows, a deterministic utility function and a stochastic decision rule. This does not alter the 
essence of the discrete and continuous choices the households face. (I will consider this 
problem more closely during summer and may end up with reconsidering my choice of 
model.)    
 
We assume that a household maximize its utility subject to constraints on time, income, and 
farm production. Utility can be derived from purchased goods (G) and the household 
members’ leisure time ( L
i ), and is affected by variables such as human capital characteristics 
(H
i) and other household and regional characteristics ( ZH) that are considered exogenous to 
current consumption decisions.  
 
(1)  U U G L L H H Z U G U L i O S
O S O S
H
i = ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ > = ( , , ; , , ) / , / , ,  ,            0 0  
 
The utility function is assumed to be ordinal and strictly concave and is maximized subject to 
constraints on time, income and farm productivity. We let 24 hours be the total time 
endowment (T ) in this model and assume that time for operator and spouse are 
heterogeneous. Time can be spent on leisure (home work, sleep, leisure time ect.) denoted  L
i , 
farm work ( F
i ), and wage work ( M
i ), all measured in number of hours. By definition all 
farm households supply a positive amount of on-farm labour hours and we assume that both 
operator and spouse work on the farm. We also assume that all individuals enjoy a strictly   6
positive number of non-working hours. Time spent in off-farm sector is a non-negative 
variable for both operator and spouse. 
 
(2)  T F M L F L M i O S
i i i i i i = + + > ‡ =                 , , , , , 0 0  
 
The consumption of market goods at price  P G will be limited by available income earned 
from farm profits, net income from wage work, and other household income, V . The farm 
households are assumed to be competitive in input and output markets and farm profit is set 
equal to the price of farm output ( P Q) multiplied with output (Q) less the variable cost of 
production (RX ), where  R is the input price vector and  X  is the quantity of purchased farm 
inputs. Off-farm work is paid at the wage rate W
i. For simplicity, we don’t include taxes in 
the model. The budget constraint of a household can then be represented by the following 
equation. 
 
(3)  P G PQ RX W M W M V G Q
O O S S = - + + +  
In the following we will treat consumer goods (G) as numeraire and set  P G equal to one. 
 
The wage rates the operator and spouse face are assumed to depend on their respective human 
capital characteristics (H
i) and the local labour market conditions ( ZM ). 
 
(4)  W W H Z i O S
i i i
M = = ( , ) ,  ,     
 
We assume flexible work schedules in off farm employment so the household members can 
maximize utility by offering an optimal number of off farm work hours and that the wage 
rates are independent of the hours worked. 
 
The properties of the farm production function represent a third and final constraint on the 
household’s consumption abilities. Farm output is a function of the labour hours put down in 
farm production ( F
i) and a vector of purchased farm inputs ( X ), and is dependent on human 
capital characteristics (H
i) and farm specific characteristics ( ZF ). While off farm wages were 
assumed to be independent of hours worked, marginal returns to farm labour are assumed to 
be diminishing. The production function is assumed to be strictly concave. 
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(5)  Q f F F X H H Z
O S O S
F = ( , , ; , , )  
 
 
The discrete choice of the maximization problem is to choose the alternative (i =12 34 , , , ) that 
gives the household the highest utility while the continuous choice is to find optimal labour 
supply in farm and off farm sector. 
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iR is individual i’s reservation wage.  i=O,S. 
 
These four alternatives are mutually exclusive. The household can only choose one of the 
above alternatives at a time. We can add another constraint to the maximization problem. 
 
(7)  D D n m n m n m = „ = 0 12 34     for all     , , , , ,  
 
Let us first assume that the utility function is deterministic, i.e. the household has full 
information on all arguments that’s included in the maximization problem. We get the optimal 
quantities of off-farm labour supply ( M
i ), the variables in household consumption (G and 
L
i ), and the variable inputs in production ( F
i and  X ) by maximizing utility (1) subject to 
constraints on time (2), budget (3) and farm productivity (5). The Lagrange function can be 
expressed like  
   8
(8)   
£ ( , , ; , , )
( , , ; , , ) ( , )
( , )
= + - - -
+ - +
+ + -
= ￿ U G L L H H Z T F M L
P f F F X H H Z RX W H Z M
W H Z M V G
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We find the optimal solution by simultaneously solving the first-order conditions. We will 
have an interior solution for all choice variables with a possible exception of off-farm work 
hours that may be zero for either operator, spouse, or both.  Neither operator nor spouse will 
work off the farm unless the wage rate they receive exceeds the marginal value of farm labour 
evaluated at the point of optimal allocation between farm work and leisure when no off-farm 
hours are supplied. 
 
Equation (13) states that the marginal value of use of purchased input factors shall equal the 
marginal cost of these factors in optimum. From equations (9) to (12) we get that, assuming 
interior solution, in optimum the marginal value of farm work must equal the marginal value 
of off-farm work and equal the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, 
i.e. marginal value of time is equal in all employments. Consumption goods are set as 
numeraire ( P G =1). 
 






i ' = =     i=O,S   9
If W
i<  P f Q i
' the individual will not supply off-farm hours and time is divided between farm 
work and leisure. If W
i> P f Q i
' the individual will increase his/her off-farm hours, thereby 
increasing the marginal value of farm work until the marginal returns to both kinds of 
employment equal the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption goods.  
  
Given the assumption that the farm household acts as price taker in input and output markets, 
the household model is recursive if an interior solution exists for all choice variables. 
Decisions on farm labour and purchased inputs are made first, and then consumption 
decisions on consumption goods and leisure.  
 
Equations (11)-(13) are then the conditions for profit maximizing usage of farm inputs and 
can be solved independently of the other equations to obtain demand functions for farm 
inputs: 
 







* ( , , , , , , ) , = =      





* ( , , , , , , ) =  
 
To obtain the demand functions for leisure time we need equations (2), (3), (5), (9), and (10) 
conditional on (11)-(13): 
 
(17)  L D W W H H Z Z V i O S
i
L
O S O S
M H
*
, ( , , , , , , , ) , = = p      
where p= - - - P Q RX W F W F Q
M M S S * * * *  
 
The off-farm labour supply functions are derived residually from the time constraint and will 
contain all exogenous variables in the constrained optimisation problem. 
 
(18) 
M T F L








, , , , , , , , , ,
= - -
= =            c h
 
 
If however optimal hours of off-farm work are zero for either operator or spouse, household 
decisions regarding production and consumption decisions must be made jointly, rather than 
recursively. Off-farm labour supply will still be made residually, but the unobservable wage 
rate for an individual not working off the farm will not be a determinant of the hours work by   10
the other partner. Still, the supply function for this partner is conditional upon the 
participation decision by the partner without off-farm employment. 
 
The reservation wage for participation in off-farm work for individual i is equal to the 
marginal value of his/her time when all time is allocated between farm work and leisure 
(T F L
i i = + ). This gives us the participation rule 
 
(19)  y
W W P f
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We assume that the off-farm labour demand equations for the operator and spouse can be 
expressed as a linear function of its arguments 
 






Mi = + + > =
=   if     | ,
0  
 
where vi  is some random disturbance. The wage rate is observed only when the decision to 
work off the farm is made which occurs if the market wage exceeds the reservation rate. As 
the reservation wage equals the marginal value of farm work when zero off-farm work hours 
is supplied it will depend on non-wage and non-price variables exogenous to the household 
consumption ( ZH), production ( ZF ) and labour supply ( ZM ) decisions represented by the 
aggregate  Z . 
 
The supply of off-farm labour depends on the exogenous variables  Z , the price variables P 
(where P is a vector  P P R V Q = ( , , )), and the wage rates as shown in equation (18). As 
mentioned, the unobservable wage rate of an individual who is not participating in off-farm 
work will not be a determinant of the spouse’s supply function. The off-farm labour supply 
functions of the four alternatives can be expressed as; 
 
(21)  M
M a W a W a Z a P W W W W
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(22)  M
M a W a W a Z a P W W W W
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By inserting for W
i from (20) we get the labour supply equations as functions of only the 
exogenous variables,  H
i,  P Q, R, V , and  Zk , where  k H F M = , , . We simplify the 
equations by letting all exogenous variables be represented by an aggregate Y, and get: 
 
(21’)  M
M a Y W W W W
M a Y W W W W
M
O
O O OR S SR
O O OR S SR
O
=
= + ‡ ‡
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S
S O OR S SR
S O OR S SR
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= + ‡ ‡
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where un  ,  n={1,2,3,4}, is a random disturbance that stems from the off-farm labour demand 
equations. We assume that uis logistically distributed with distribution function 
1
1+ - exp( ) Y
, 
zero mean and variance equal to p
2 3 / . 
 
Each individual chooses his/her course of action on the principle that the other’s behaviour is 
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This kind of conditional behaviour is not necessarily compatible. In order to make these 
conditional distributions unambiguously define a course of action, the condition 
a Y a Y a Y a Y
1 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 + = +  must be satisfied (Gourieroux 2000:57).  
 
When each variable can take on only two values (0,1) the conditional probabilities can be 
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To prove that a Y a Y a Y a Y
1 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 + = + is a necessary condition we start with the lemma: 
(*) 
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Pr | Pr |
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y y y y
y y y y
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By replacing the conditional probabilities in (*) with the conditional logit distribution in (23) 
we obtain: 
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1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
- = = - = =
= = = =
=
- = = - = =
= = = =
Pr | Pr |
Pr | Pr |
Pr | Pr |
Pr | Pr |
y y y y
y y y y
y y y y
y y y y
O S S O
O S S O
O S S O
O S S O
m r n s m r n s
m r m r
m r n s m r n s
m r m r
 
 
(**)   
exp( )exp( ) exp( )exp( ) a Y a Y a Y a Y
a Y a Y a Y a Y
2 2 4 4 1 1 3 3
2 2 4 4 1 1 3 3
=
+ = +               
 
 
Which is the compatability condition. 
 
We can now utilize this condition to express the joint probabilities. We know that the left 
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11 = + exp( )  
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P a Y P 01
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11 =exp( )  
 
while  P 11 can be expressed as 
P P P P 11 00 10 01 1 = - + + ( )  
 
This gives us the following probabilities for the four alternatives the household are faced 
with: 
 
Alternative  D 1: both operator and spouse work off-farm: 
 
(24)  Pr ,
exp( ) exp( ) exp( )
y y
a Y a Y a Y





1 1 4 4 2 2 m r  
 
Alternative  D2: only operator works off-farm:   14
 
(25)  Pr ,
exp( )
exp( ) exp( ) exp( )
y y
a Y
a Y a Y a Y





1 1 4 4 2 2 m r  
 
Alternative  D3: only the spouse works off-farm: 
 
(26)  Pr ,
exp( )
exp( ) exp( ) exp( )
y y
a Y
a Y a Y a Y





1 1 4 4 2 2 m r  
 
Alternative  D4: neither operator nor spouse works off-farm: 
 
(27)  Pr ,
exp( )
exp( ) exp( ) exp( )
y y
a Y a Y
a Y a Y a Y





2 2 4 4




Let Y j J
j ,  =12 , ,...,  , represent  the J possible values of the vector of explanatory variables in 
(22’) and (23’), and call a “trial of type j” a run of the experiment performed under the 
conditions Y Y n
nj = =  , ( 12 34 , , , ). Let there be mj  such trials (Gourieroux 2000:20).  
 
In the bivariate case as outlined above we have observations on the pairs 
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The probability distribution functions are all strictly positive,  F k k
k k 1 2 0 1 2 > " , ,      
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and the compatability constraint a Y a Y a Y a Y
1 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 + = + .  
 
 
The log of the likelihood function is then given by 
 
(28)  log ( ; ) log[ ( )] L y a m P a k k j
k k j
J
k k j =












































where  F j n
k k 1 2( ) indicates the partial derivative of  F j
k k 1 2( ) with respect to the n-th coordinate. 
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The maximum likelihood estimator aML which solves the equation system converges 
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According to Gourieroux (2000:93) a much simpler estimation method for the conditional 
logit model is given as follows: 






1 2 =  be the observed frequencies for each trial of type j, a
1 we can be 







 and applying the 
Berkson’s method. Then the observed frequencies pk k j 1 2  asymptotically converges to the true 
probabilities  P a




The data for my analysis can mainly be obtained from a yearly survey of Norwegian farm 
households (Account Results in Agriculture and Forestry) collected by the Norwegian 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (NILF). The survey is one of the more   17
comprehensive sources of farm statistics in Norway, but has so far had little widespread use in 
applied research. The survey dates back to the beginning of the 20th century and has since 
1950 included approximately 1000 farm households representing different regions and 
principal productions (grain, dairy, livestock etc.). Participation in the survey is voluntary but 
restricted to farmers younger than the age of 67 (retirement age) and to farm households 
working at least 400 on-farm hours on a yearly basis. Farms that produce both grain and 
swine products, and dairy farms (pure dairy farms or dairy in combination with livestock 
production) have the highest representation both in absolute numbers and as share of the total 
population. Most farm households in the survey report between 1800 and 6000 on-farm work 
hours yearly, while a standard man-labour year in the agricultural sector is set like 1875 
hours. There is no specific decision rule used for entering new households, but one aims to 
enter farm households that hold more or less the same characteristics (region/size/production) 
as the exiting farms. Somewhere between five and ten percent of the farm households are 
replaced each year, most commonly because the exiting households don’t wish to continue 
being part of the survey. 
 
The Account Results in Agriculture and Forestry is the most elaborate source of information 
on Norwegian farm households financial matters both in a regional and a production type of 
context. The survey includes data on daily or weekly labour hours for all household members, 
family members, and hired help and in all employments. On-farm labour compensation is 
calculated using the cost of hired help, added holiday allowances and social security 
payments, and off-farm income is divided between wage work and other income. The survey 
also includes data on total area of cultivated land and the division of land into different uses 
and the yield of and income from different agricultural crops, fruit, garden berries and 
vegetables. To allow for calculation of obtained prices from farm sales, the turnover from all 
farm products are registered. Also the household’s consumption of own production is 
registered. All costs of production are reported in total figures for each and every production 
input. Finally, the survey includes detailed balance sheets information and profit and loss 
accounts for all households, including information on production grants, interest payments, 
tax payments, and investment grants. The data set does not contain information on personal 
and family characteristics such as education, martial status, and family size which have been 
found to be important explanatory variables in estimating farmers’ off-farm work 
participation and off-farm labour supply (see e.g. Huffman 1980 and Weersink 1992).   18
Sample selection 
I have not yet tried to estimate my model on the data described above. I will need to decide on 
what empirical model best suits my purpose and I plan to run some estimations during 
summer. I plan to extract a ten-year panel, 1991-2000, from the Account Results survey and 
to account for the lacking variables of this survey by matching the data with statistics from 
Statistics Norway to be able to include at least the household members’ level of education and 
family size. I have not yet decided exactly what variables will be included in the estimations.  
 
Comments and further challenges 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper my intention was to specify a random utility 
model inspired by the work of Hanemann (1984) though probably following the outline of 
McFaddens conditional logit model. This proved to be a rather complex problem and the main 
obstacle is that my problem is to derive labour supply equations that does not directly enter 
the utility function.  
 
My confusion was based on the selection of discrete choice variable, either: 
 
Choose the alternative that generates the higher utility: 
D
U U U U U n
n
n =
= = R S T
1 12 34
0
1 2 3 4    if    Max    
   otherwise
* * * * * ( , , , ) , , ,
 
or 
choose the participation rule: 
y
W W P f






















   if  
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I am uncertain whether these discrete choices can be integrated within a single framework for 
a two-stage estimation or not, where 
Stage one: Calculate the probability of choosing alternative n 
Stage two: Choose the alternative that yields the higher utility 
 
A matter that needs further investigation is my choice of participation rule for off-farm labour 
supply. I doubt the definition of the reservation wage I have used is very adequate, 
particularly for the spouses. Another question is whether it is relevant for my problem to   19
include the joint decisions of husband and wife if the off-farm labour decisions of the spouses 
are independent of the farm production decisions. I have been considering whether the tobit 
model might better serve my purpose, and I also have to extend the model framework to 
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